The Struggle for Montenegro

The Struggle for Montenegro: Moscow's Hybrid War

The Struggle for Montenegro


Moscow’s Hybrid War

For the Kremlin, controlling Montenegro is an opportunity to have its own proxy in NATO. For Belgrade, it’s a chance to regain the territory, which declared independence in June 2006.

What Russia fears most. Montenegrin President Milo Đukanović (L) and NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg, 2018.

The Montenegrin government survived a coup attempt in 2016, and the country joined the Western alliance the following year.

In 2017, Moscow began a campaign to destabilise Podgorica through its most important allies in the area: Serbia and Republika Srpska, and the Church of Serbia.

Although Russia played a significant role in the peaceful restoration of Montenegrin independence in 2006, and Russian oligarchs who invested in businesses and real estate were the driving force behind the Montenegrin “economic boom” since 2007, the government’s pursuit of the West and the decision to join NATO were key reasons for undermining the new state.

To increase its political influence in Europe, Moscow decided at the end of 2008 to unite the forces of the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies – GRU, SVR, FSB – and to create a network that would be able to destabilise countries of strategic importance to Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy.

These initiatives aligned with Russian interest in controlling the Western Balkans. Moscow began an extensive campaign to destabilise Montenegro, instrumentalising local pro-Russian and pro-Serbian parties, radical organisations and associations, as well as public figures and the media.

At that time, Montenegro was not yet under direct attack; it was counted on for long-term, friendly business connections.

For Moscow, ex-Soviet states such as Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine, as well as Georgia and Kazakhstan, and indirect action in politically strong member states of the European Union, such as Germany, Italy and France, were more critical.

In the Balkans, the key pillar of Russian influence was Serbia, especially after the pro-Western Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was assassinated, and Serbian progressives, renegades from Vojislav Seselj’s radicals – Toma Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić – took absolute power in the largest and most populous country in the region.

In the meantime, Montenegro welcomed Russian oligarchs ready to invest with open arms, such as aluminium magnate Oleg Deripaska whose company Rusal bought the aluminium plant in Podgorica, and the company Midland, which acquired the ironworks in Nikšić.

Russian investments in Montenegro were significantly higher compared to other countries in transition in the region. This was the conclusion in 2007 of the European Commission, which, at the request of the European Parliament, investigated Russian money laundering in the country.

The Moscow-Podgorica idyll lasted only a few years. Everything turned around in the middle of 2013.

Please find the entire article at the following link https://thebattleground.eu/2023/03/09/the-struggle-for-montenegro/